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BOOK NOTICE 
Rationalizing Juvenile Justice 
Carolyn J. Frantz* 
AMERICAN YOUTH VIOLENCE. By Franklin E. Zimring. New York: 
Oxford University Press. 1998. Pp. xiii, 209. $29.95. 
Few issues have occupied the public mind so much in recent years 
as the problem of youth violence. Due to sensational school shootings 
and public paranoia about the violence of youth gangs, America is 
concerned - very concerned - about the growing criminality of its 
children. In our concern, we find ourselves caught in the classic co­
nundrum of criminal responsibility: reconciling the unavoidable 
knowledge that much of human behavior is determined with our 
strong instincts about free will. We blame violent television and video 
games, we blame single mothers, we blame low church attendance, but 
when all is said and done, we punish the child. The concrete response 
to our fears about increasing youth violence has been increased ac­
countability for young offenders, and growing rhetoric about the 
genuine evil that exists even in seemingly innocent youth. 
Franklin Zimring1 confronts this trend of "getting tough" on young 
offenders in his most recent book, American Youth Violence. The ba­
sic aim of his project is to quell the storm of youth crime policy moti­
vated by "fear and hostility" towards young offenders (p. xiii). In­
creased length of punishment, as well as abandonment of efforts at 
reform, have characterized the recent moves in juvenile justice. 
Zimring argues against these trends. 
Zimring approaches the problem of youth criminality in a re­
markably comprehensive manner. He comes at the issues from all an­
gles - he is at the same time a social scientist, a policy specialist, and a 
legal philosopher. He uses empirical data to challenge (quite con­
vincingly) the perception that American youth are increasingly violent 
(pp. 31-47). He uses his empirical findings to suggest reforms, such as 
changes in firearms policy, that would be likely to make a difference in 
the degree of violence among young people (pp. 89-106). Most im-
* Thanks to Thomas Green and Abigail Carter for careful reading of drafts and invalu­
able discussion. 
1. William G. Simon Professor of Law and Director of the Earl Warren Legal Institute, 
University of California at Berkeley. 
1974 
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pressively, Zimring ties all of this together with deep legal and social 
debates about youth criminal responsibility. He not only tells us what 
the data say, but what they mean. 
This impressive integration of views leads Zimring to a unified per­
spective on American youth violence that is rational and coherent. 
His main critique of existing means of dealing with youth violence is 
that they are illogical. He argues, for instance, that if a certain large 
percentage of youth who commit isolated violent acts never repeat 
them in adulthood, then violence is, by and large, "kid stuff" (p. 84). 
For Zimring it is silly and counterproductive to follow recent trends 
and put these kids in jail for some extended time, impeding their nor­
mal development, and it is wrongheaded to brand them as evil crimi­
nal predators (pp. 81-85). Zimring also seeks rational consistency be­
tween youth crime policy and other policies concerning youth. He 
suggests, for example, that our views of the risk of youth crime ought 
to be in some way informed by our views of the risks of youth driving. 
If society is willing to bear some risk to public safety in order to allow 
young people to develop into less risky adult drivers, perhaps it ought 
to be willing to tolerate the same degree of youth criminality as part of 
normal youth development (pp. 85-86). Similarly, he analogizes laws 
relating to alcohol to youth criminal responsibility - if the trend is to 
raise the age of legal possession of alcohol, he asks, how can this be 
consistent with lowering the age of criminal responsibility for commis­
sion of crimes (p. 81)? 
Zimring's drive towards logic and coherence in social responses to 
youth violence is admirable and compelling (p. 127). But it raises the 
question whether approaches to criminality can ever be rational in the 
way that Zimring hopes. As this Notice will show, the criminal justice 
system serves an important role in affirming the reality of free will and 
personal responsibility in society, a role that often conflicts with en­
lightened viewpoints about acceptable risks and social scientific un­
derstandings. What appear to Zimring to be incoherencies are actu­
ally crucial strategies for holding the line on personal responsibility in 
the face of nagging awareness of the degrees to which human behavior 
is determined.2 This tension between free will and determinism leads 
to a constant negotiation between holding responsibility and denying 
it, the ultimate settlement of which is anything but neatly consistent.3 
2 See generally Barry C. Feld, Abolish the Juvenile Court: Youthfulness, Criminal Re­
sponsibility, and Sentencing Policy, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 68 (1997); Thomas A. 
Green, Freedom and Criminal Responsibility in the Age of Pound: An Essay on Criminal 
Justice, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1915 (1995) [hereinafter Green I]. 
3. Some deny the existence of any logical contradiction within the criminal law on the 
issue of criminal responsibility. For instance, Michael Moore has explained away the prob­
lem by taking a staunchly deterministic stance and describing most of the seemingly "free 
will"-based criminal law as based on practical (utilitarian) considerations about deterrability. 
See Michael S. Moore, Causation and the Excuses, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1091 (1985). But most 
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By placing free will and determinism at the center of debates about 
criminal justice, this Notice follows upon the conceptual frame set out 
by Thomas A. Green in his historical examinations of criminal justice 
at the beginning of this century.4 Green has pointed to some of the 
ways in which the major structures of criminal law during this era can 
be explained by the tension between the two views of criminal respon­
sibility. This Notice aims to show that this tension must also be ad­
dressed when suggesting criminal justice reforms today.5 Zimring has 
failed to listen to the lessons of history - particularly the Progressive 
Era, when similar attempts to rationalize the criminal justice system 
failed.6 Zimring must deal with the debates about criminal responsi­
bility that caused this failure if he wishes his contemporary reforms to 
succeed. 
I. THE "COMING STORM" 
Zimring begins his book by highlighting the logical inconsistencies 
that can be caused by the debate between free will and determinism.7 
He notes the popularity of fears about a "coming storm" of "juvenile 
super-predators," hardened young criminals.8 The fears are based on 
demographics - assumptions that certain social conditions uniformly 
produce these kinds of offenders. If we really believe this, Zimring 
argues, why should our response to the coming storm be an increasing 
call for treating juveniles harshly, as if they had free will? "[A]rguing 
that the later course of criminal careers can be predicted long in ad-
people understand criminal responsibility to reflect genuine moral condemnation based on 
the reality of free will. The general perception of a tension between the two stances at the 
very least affects behavior and policy in these areas. 
4. See Green I, supra note 2, at 2043-53. Green is in the process of bringing his investi­
gations forward through the Progressive Era and into the present. See Thomas A. Green, 
Conventional Morality, Positivism, and the Rule of Law: Perspectives on Freedom and 
Criminal Responsibility in Mid-Twentieth Century America {1930·1960) {Feb. 1, 2000) (un­
published manuscript, on file with author) [hereinafter Green II]. In dealing with juvenile 
justice, this Notice addresses issues that Green has not fully investigated. Thus, my sugges­
tions for how to proceed in this area are my own. 
5. I have benefited from discussions with Green about criminal justice in the post-1960s 
period. 
6. See DAVID J. ROTHMAN, CONSCIENCE AND CONVENIENCE: THE ASYLUM AND ITS 
ALTERNATIVES IN PROGRESSIVE AMERICA 61 {1980) {describing the "logical" thrust of 
Progressive reform). 
7. Precise definitions for "free will" and "determinism" are hard to come by, and have 
occupied libraries of philosophical literature. For the purposes of this Notice, the reader 
should rely on her instincts, however vague and unsatisfying, about this conceptual distinc­
tion. 
8. Pp. 4-5 (quoting Bill McCollum, April 30, 1996. Testimony Before the House Sub­
committee on Early Childhood, Youth, and Families. Washington, D.C. U.S. Government 
Printing Office). 
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vance seems inconsistent with doctrines of free will and moral ac­
countability, which are important to the case for adult punishment and 
responsibility" (p. 11). To Zimring, whatever degrees of determina­
tion are reflected in statistics should be compatible with the degree of 
responsibility assigned to criminals at trial. 
Zimring's logical move assumes that the role social scientists play 
in society is identical to that of criminal courts. If deterministic in­
sights are accepted within social science, they should also be accepted 
in the criminal justice system. But there is a difference. Society has 
strong reasons for wishing to maintain a criminal justice system whose 
primary philosophy is that of free will, a need that does not extend to 
social science. It is because of their special role as fora for social af­
firmation of personal responsibility that courts are required to reflect 
a belief in free will not necessarily borne out by the social scientific 
data. 
This need became apparent during the Progressive Era. Positivis­
tic social scientists and jurists attempted to model all of criminal jus­
tice to reflect a deterministic vision.9 Despite relatively widespread 
belief in the scientific truth of these thinkers' viewpoint, Progressive 
society found itself reluctant to incorporate those insights into the 
functioning of criminal courts. This positivist agenda was instead met 
by fear that bringing such a deterministic perspective into the court 
system would lead to a wide-scale loss of personal responsibility ac­
companied by an increase in criminality,10 as well as a lessening of the 
psychic1 1  and spiritual 12 health of individual citizens. It was not healthy 
for a society to focus on the excuses that everyone undoubtedly has 
for wrongdoing. If society did not retain a focus on free will, it was 
thought, citizens would not feel an obligation to escape the bounds of 
9. During the Progressive Era, the early part of the 20th century, there were significant 
changes in the way criminality was conceptualized. Reformers influenced by largely deter­
ministic social science and psychology (here referred to as "positivists") "were convinced 
that they understood the complex causes of crime and were capable of designing a program 
to eradicate it." ROTHMAN, supra note 6, at 45. These reformers reconceptualized the pur­
poses of the criminal system to be treatment rather than punishment, and attempted (with 
only limited degrees of success) to shape the law and criminal justice institutions to reflect 
this view. See generally id. As a strategy for succeeding in the midst of strong popular sup­
port for free will-based views of criminality, Progressive jurists tended to focus on reforming 
the institutions of penology, while conceding much of guilt assessment to the traditional 
view. See Green I, supra note 2, at 1918, 1925-26. 
10. See Green II, supra note 4, at 145, 150. 
11. See Robert P. Knight, Determinism, "Freedom," and Psychotherapy, 9 PSYCHIATRY 
251, 259 (1946), discussed in Green II, supra note 4, at 142-45. 
12 See Green II, supra note 4, at 145-50 (discussing SIR WALTER MOBERLY, 
REsPONSIBILITY (1951)). 
1978 Michigan Law Review (Vol. 98:1974 
their own circumstances. Treating people who did not have real 
choice "as jf" they did was good for them and good for everyone else.13 
This fear of encroaching determinism in the criminal justice system 
persists (in fact thrives) today. The popularity of books such as James 
Q. Wilson's Moral Judgment (subtitled, appropriately, Does the Abuse 
Excuse Threaten Our Legal System?) is testimony. Many believe that 
"a sense of personal responsibility . .. has withered " in the presence of 
legal excuses that recognize the possibly determined nature of some 
adult criminal behavior.14 Allow evidence of battered women's syn­
drome and temporary insanity, and what you end up with is the 
"Twinkie defense. "15 No one could put the response to the Progres­
sive positivists in better modern language than Wilson: 
We are all exposed to temptations, we all on occasion lack self-control; 
some of us face acute temptations or are remarkably deficient in self­
control. It is the task of the law to raise, not lower, the ante in these cir­
cumstances . . .. [I]t is the task of the law not only to remind us of what is 
wrong . .. but also to remind us that we must work hard to conform to 
the law.16 
Fears of what might happen if the law abandons its commitment to 
free will in the criminal justice system, remain compelling in the mod­
ern context. 
Thus, the justice system must, in some way, preserve the free will­
based viewpoint that allows certain offenders to be labeled "juvenile 
super-predators." While the criminal justice system is there to fulfill 
the social function of affirming free will, Zimring and other social sci­
entists are free to probe the truth of determinism. When social scien­
tists are carrying out empirical work on potential criminality, their 
findings are intellectual, largely reserved for specialists in the field. 
The social need to affirm free will through such findings is not par­
ticularly strong. It is primarily the court that speaks to the public. 17 
The phenomenon is not limited to scientific predictions about ju­
venile criminality. Lots of research is done every year predicting the 
13. See generally Wilber G. Katz, Responsibility and Freedom, 5 J. LEGAL EDUC. 269 
(1953). 
14. JAMES Q. WILSON, MORALJUDGMENT 1 (1997). 
15. The public obsession with this defense arose from a case where the defendant's ex­
pert witness, attempting to make the case for diminished responsibility, included his con­
sumption of junk food as an element of his psychological state. See id. at 2, 22-23, 48-58. 
16. Id. at 27-28. 
17. For instance, by participating injuries, lay people are invited to listen to the message 
sent by the criminal justice system, as well as to communicate with the broader public. This 
discussion is frequently about personal responsibility. See generally Sherman J. Clark, The 
Courage of Our Convictions, 97 MICH. L. REV. 2381 (1999). 
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criminality of adults based on poverty or other social circumstances.18 
Yet these studies have not formed the basis for changing the adult 
courts to reflect a lessor degree of criminal responsibility. A distinc­
tion between the sorts of conclusions that are allowed in scientific 
journals and in the courtroom reflects the unique role courts play in 
affirming free will in the face of scientific skepticism. 
A similar response applies to Zimring's attempts to make youth 
criminal justice consistent with other areas of youth policy, such as 
driving policy, and access to alcohol.19 In a sense, Zimring is right. 
Society tolerates a certain amount of risk in order to enable young 
people to grow into responsible drivers, no doubt more risk than it 
tolerates in order to allow young people to pass through stages of 
criminality. He is also right about alcohol policy. Raising the age for 
legal consumption of alcohol does in some way reflect a vision of 
youth irresponsibility that is in tension with the trend towards lower­
ing the age of criminal responsibility. The answer to these incoheren­
cies, however, is an easy one. Driving policy and alcohol policy have 
not taken on so central a role in the social fight to maintain a sense of 
individual responsibility as has the criminal justice system.20 Few have 
fears like Wilson's about the effect the message sent by raising the 
driving age will have on the social fabric. Criminal justice policy, by 
contrast, is where free will is affirmed. Its message on the matter of 
responsibility is broadcast loudly throughout the culture. The risk 
posed by youth criminality is different in kind from the risk posed by 
youth driving. It poses a challenge to basic social understandings of 
individual responsibility that cannot be ignored. 
II. THE JUVENILE COURT 
For most of the rest of the book, Zimring turns his logical eye to 
examining the way criminal responsibility is attributed to young of­
fenders. Section II.A sets out Zimring's plan for reform of this system. 
One of its most remarkable features is Zimring's rejection of the juve­
nile court as a conceptually separate criminal justice system that al­
lows a more deterministic view of the offenders within it. Instead, 
Zimring proposes a unified adult/juvenile court philosophy that some­
how manages to retain a focus on free will while accommodating the 
deterministic insights of social science. Section II.B issues a caution to 
18. See generally Irene Merker Rosenberg et al., Return of the Stubborn and Rebellious 
Son: An Independent Sequel on the Prediction of Future Criminality, 37 BRANDEIS LJ. 511 
(1998). 
19. See supra pp. 1975-77. 
20. For a discussion of criminal responsibility as the stage upon which basic issues of 
free will and determinism are perpetually played out, see Green I, supra note 2, at 1915-17, 
1925. 
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Zimring's project. It suggests that because of the need to preserve a 
safe space for free will condemnation of criminal behavior, the main 
adult criminal justice system cannot accommodate as much determin­
ism as Zimring recommends. Section II.C provides historical perspec­
tive by identifying attempts to incorporate determinism into adult 
criminal justice in the Progressive Era and beyond that have failed for 
precisely this reason. Section II.D demonstrates that the present allo­
cation of offenders into the juvenile and adult systems is actually logi­
cal when viewed in relation to these features of criminal justice. 
A. Rational Reform 
Zimring's recommendations for dealing with young offenders sug­
gest a view of youth criminality that is primarily deterministic. 
Zimring focuses on the way particular features of youth lessen juvenile 
offenders' blameworthiness for crimes they commit (pp. 76-81). 
Linked to his skepticism about the responsibility of young off enders 
for their crimes are his recommendations about proper punishment. 
Young offenders, influenced as they are by their immaturity and by 
particular social circumstances, have "room to reform." Thus, they 
also have strong claims to reform-based rather than purely retributive 
punishment (pp. 142-43). According to Zimring, "the response of the 
criminal justice system to adolescent violence can only be coherent" if 
it reflects the lessened blameworthiness and the strong claims to re­
form of young offenders (p. 127). 
To make the system coherent, Zimring recommends individualiz­
ing judgments of guilt and sentencing (p. 136). This theme runs 
throughout his book, forming the basis for most of his arguments 
about the proper approach to youth violence. There is no such thing 
as a typical adolescent homicide, Zimring argues (pp. 134-37). Each 
one is different, and courts must take individual circumstances into ac­
count if they want to be "coherent in making retributive judgments" 
(p. 132). Generalizing about any sort of violent youth offenders, he 
claims, is unwise given the wide distribution of characteristics (p. 163). 
Looking at each young offender's individual circumstances, and tai­
loring the response to match her degree of responsibility and her pos­
sibilities for reform, is the rational response to such divergence. 
Adopting such an individualized system, according to Zimring, 
should not be too difficult for our criminal justice system. It flows 
naturally from the principle of penal proportionality, he claims, that 
the punishment should fit the degree of responsibility of the individual 
offender. Zimring claims that this principle is already inherent as one 
of the central ideals of the entire criminal justice system, including the 
adult system (pp. 75-76). Adults should be held more or less culpable 
for the crimes they commit, in accordance with the degree of freedom 
they individually possess, and be punished accordingly. He does not 
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discuss the extent to which that ideal has been realized in the present 
system,21 but he is certain that this principle is, at the very least, a rec­
ognized ideal to which the criminal justice system could (and should) 
be held. For Zimring, all decisions of the criminal justice system, af­
fecting juveniles and adults alike, should involve a sensitive individual 
inquiry. 
It is Zimring's belief that his ideal juvenile justice philosophy is al­
ready implicit as the ideal for the adult system that causes him to give 
up on keeping young offenders in the juvenile court, thus conceding 
one of the main strategies for preserving a less punitive agenda for ju­
veniles.22 For Zimring, preserving the jurisdiction of the juvenile court 
is unnecessary. All that is necessary is making the adult court live up 
to its own ideals. Even in adult court, Zimring claims, the special dis­
advantages of the offenders' youth should be taken into account. 
Adult court justice, like juvenile justice, ought to be sensitive to de­
grees of individual culpability and the possibilities of reform through 
sentencing.23 Thus, according to Zimring, it makes no difference 
which court ends up with the young offender, so long as that court acts 
in accordance with Zimring's general principles (pp.127-28). 
For Zimring, the ideal jurisdictional division between the juvenile 
and adult courts depends on whether the court is empowered to pro­
vide the particular length of punishment that the individual young of­
fender requires. A young offender ought to end up in adult court 
when he should have a sentence that is greater than that which can be 
levied by the juvenile court (p. 169). For Zimring, that decision is 
again ultimately based on the rule of penal proportionality (and, by 
extension, on the individual maturity and culpability of the offender) 
(pp. 109, 127-28). Zimring thus envisions a seamless transition be­
tween the offenders sent to juvenile court and those that end up in 
adult court. In either court, an offender gets exactly what he deserves, 
perfectly tailored to his individual responsibility. The decision to 
waive a young offender into adult court becomes, in a way, no big 
deal, nothing that needs to be probed in any more depth than the de­
termination of the precise gradation of punishment deserved by an in­
dividual offender. 
21. For this Notice's discussion of this issue, see infra text accompanying notes 29-31. 
22. Zimring is not the only scholar to adopt such a view. Many "progressive abolition­
ists" recommend eliminating the juvenile court altogether and attempting to achieve the 
goals of juvenile justice in adult court. See, e.g., Janet E. Ainsworth, Re-Imagining Child­
hood and Reconstructing the Legal Order: The Case for Abolishing the Juvenile Court, 69 
N.C. L. REV. 1083 (1991); Katherine Hunt Federle, The Abolition of the Juvenile Court: A 
Proposal for the Preservation of Children's Legal Rights, 16 J. CONTEMP. L. 23 (1990); Barry 
C. Feld, The Transformation of the Juvenile Court, 75 MINN. L. REV. 691 (1991). 
23. See, e.g., p. 122 ("[A]n increased volume of juvenile homicides processed in adult 
courts should reduce somewhat the average severity of the sanctions because more cases of 
lesser seriousness would be in the adult court for sentencing."). 
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Zimring glosses over what is typically considered the main differ­
ence between the juvenile and the adult court systems - the farmer's 
focus on reform and the latter's on retribution - by denying the exis­
tence of serious conflict between the two priorities. In most cases, 
Zimring claims, the two goals can be met simultaneously. According 
to Zimring, the range of retributively appropriate sentences includes 
the sentence that would best facilitate reform. The needs of reform 
can be met, he suggests, by allowing judges to determine where, within 
the morally mandated range, the sentence will fall (pp. 142-45). In in­
stances when a young person deserves more punishment than his re­
form requires, Zimring concedes that the minimum sentence necessary 
to address the offender's blameworthiness must (regrettably) "carry 
the day" (p. 143). But in an adult system where desert is tailored to 
take account of every individual's special disabilities (including those 
of youth), these unfortunate moments should be rare (p. 143). 
For Zimring, the adult penal system can also provide the reform 
efforts that young people need. Zimring argues that "whenever a 
young offender's need for protection, education, and skill develop­
ment can be accommodated without frustrating community security, 
there is a government obligation to do so" (p. 144). Who could com­
plain, Zimring suggests, if during the time they are paying their moral 
debt, we give them treatment and reform rather than brutal hopeless 
imprisonment (p.145)? 
Thus, Zimring's reform efforts rely on the melding of the adult and 
juvenile systems to reflect the same priorities. The adult system can 
recognize the lessened responsibility of young offenders through the 
principle of penal proportionality, and it can accommodate their spe­
cial claims to reform without sacrificing its focus on retribution. 
B. Two Systems 
Zimring would not be so sanguine about suggesting that juvenile 
and adult courts could share the philosophy of individualized respon­
sibility and the focus on reform if he took a hard look at the differ­
ences between the two systems that have existed since the juvenile 
court's inception, and persist today. Zimring neglects to consider the 
forces that have made the adult system considerably less flexible and 
reform-minded than the juvenile court. These differences exist for a 
reason: society demands that the adult court, in order to fulfill its task 
of reaffirming free will, keep a safe space for the holding of responsi­
bility, free of the corrupting and encroaching influences of determinis­
tic thinking. Insofar as Zimring's reform efforts require introducing 
determinism into the mainstream adult system, their failure seems in­
evitable. 
Despite Zimring's attempts to create a seamless transition between 
the two systems, major differences in philosophy remain. The juvenile 
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court system recognizes individual lack of responsibility much more 
readily than the adult court. By initial design, the juvenile court was 
less of a criminal court and more of a social service agency. Because 
those coming before it were not viewed as wholly responsible, reform 
was its central goal, not retribution.24 This philosophy is still part of 
the juvenile court, as evidenced by the fact that offenders in the juve­
nile court system still lack some protections that are constitutionally 
required in the adult system. The notion is that these protections are 
not required when young offenders are not being condemned for their 
acts, but rather helped to overcome the influence of external responsi­
bility-compromising forces.25 Particularly in light of the movements to 
"get tough" on juvenile offenders that Zimring identifies, the juvenile 
court is moving further and further from that philosophy (pp. 13-16). 
Correspondingly, an increasing number of constitutional protections 
have been added to the juvenile court system.26 Some have even sug­
gested that the juvenile court has gone so far afield from its non­
criminal nature that young offenders would be better served if it were 
abolished. If they are not going to be treated from a reform perspec­
tive, the argument goes, they might at least get the procedural protec­
tions the adult court has to offer.27 The very idea of the drift, however, 
confirms that there is something basically different about the missions 
of the juvenile and adult court systems. By and large, the idea that 
youth are not fully responsible for their crimes still resonates with so­
ciety. 28 With all of its imperfections, the juvenile justice system does 
retain a fair portion of the deterministic perspective with which it be­
gan. 
By contrast, the extent to which the free will philosophy reigns in 
the adult court is underscored by the fate of Zimring's beloved "core 
value" of individual penal proportionality there. If, as Zimring sug­
gests, individualization is the ideal of the adult as well as the juvenile 
court, the adult court is far from accepting it. Consider the defense of 
diminished responsibility. When courts are asked to lessen the guilt of 
individual sane adults on the grounds that they are (by degrees) less 
24. See generally ANTHONY M. PLAIT, THE CmLD SAVERS: THE INVENTION OF 
DELINQUENCY (2d ed. 1977) (1969). 
25. P. 169. For instance, juveniles do not have a right to a jury trial because the juvenile 
court's mission is "reformative." See McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 547 (1971). 
26. For instance, the prohibition on double jeopardy and the requirement of proof "be­
yond a reasonable doubt" now apply to juvenile proceedings. See Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 
519 (1975); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967). 
27. See Feld, supra note 2, at 68-69. 
28. See, e.g., David Yellen, The Enduring Difference of Youth, 47 U. KAN. L. REV. 995, 
997 (1999). 
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responsible than others, they overwhelmingly refuse.29 The trend in 
adult courts, if anything, is to further lessen the degree to which dif­
ferences in individual responsibility can affect punishment.30 This was 
further fueled by the retributivist turn in American criminal justice, 
which began in the late 1960s.31 Exemplifying the trend, the federal 
sentencing guidelines even more greatly reduce the possibility that in­
dividual lack of responsibility will be taken into account when deter­
mining punishment.32 Even though the sentencing guidelines allow for 
some departures, in general the very personal characteristics that con­
stitute individual responsibility are not (and perhaps cannot easily be) 
taken into account in such a rigid system.33 
Zimring acknowledges that the adult court, despite the principle of 
penal proportionality, has not been living up to its obligation to take 
29. See Sanford H. Kadish, Fifty Years of Criminal Law: An Opinionated Review, 87 
CAL. L. REV. 943, 956, 961-962. (1999); see also, e.g., Bethea v. United States, 365 A.2d 64, 
87-88 (D.C. 1976) ("The concept of insanity is sintply a device the law employs to define the 
outer lintits of that segment of the general population to whom these presumptions con­
cerning the capacity for crintinal intent shall not be applied. The line between the sane and 
the insane for the purposes of crintinal adjudication is not drawn because for one group the 
actual existence of the necessary mental state (or lack thereof) can be determined with any 
greater certainty, but rather because those whom the law declares insane are demonstrably 
so aberrational in their psychiatric characteristics that we choose to make the assumption 
that they are incapable of possessing the specified state of mind. Within the range of indi­
viduals who are not 'insane', the law does not recognize the readily demonstrable fact that as 
between individual crintinal defendants the nature and development of their mental capa­
bilities may vary greatly") (footnote omitted); Commonwealth v. Mazza, 313 N.E.2d 875, 878 
(Mass. 1974) ("[T]here is no intermediate stage of partial criminal responsibility between 
insanity and ordinary responsibility as defined by statute."). But see People v. Wolff, 394 
P. 2d 959 (Cal. 1964) (recognizing dintinished responsibility); Henry Weihofen, Partial Insan­
ity and Criminal Intent, 24 ILL. L. REV. 505, 508 (1930) (arguing that there is no clear divide 
between the sane and insane). 
30. See Kadish, supra note 29, at 979-81. 
31. For a critique of this movement, see David Dolinko, Three Mistakes of Retriblltiv­
ism, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1623 (1992). 
32 See generally Albert W. Alschuler, The Failure of Sentencing Guidelines: A Plea for 
Less Aggregation, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 901 (1991); Daniel J. Freed, Federal Sentencing in the 
Wake of Guidelines: Unacceptable Limits on the Discretion of Sentencers, 101 YALE L.J. 
1681 (1992). For some strained arguments to the contrary, see S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 52-53 
(1983) ("The purpose of the sentencing guidelines is to provide a structure for evaluating the 
fairness and appropriateness of the sentence for an individual offender, not to eliminate the 
thoughtful intposition of individualized sentences. Indeed, the use of sentencing guidelines 
will actually enhance the individualization of sentences as compared to current law."). But 
see Kate Stith & Steve Y. Koh, The Politics of Sentencing Reform: The Legislative History of 
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 28 WAKEFORESTL. REV. 223, 257, 272-73 (1993) (char­
acterizing these statements as "soothing assurances"); Frank O. Bowman, III, The Quality of 
Mercy Must Be Restrained, and Other Lessons in Learning to Love the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines, 1996 WIS. L. REV. 679, 700-701. 
33. See David Yellen, What Juvenile Court Abolitionists Can Learn From the Failures of 
Sentencing Reform, 1996 WIS. L. REV. 577, 586. Green suggests that the due process and 
equal protection arguments for the guidelines also "reflect a desire to strain out ... causal 
factors." See Green I, supra note 2, at 2044-45. 
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into account the diminished responsibility of young offenders. But his 
analysis and recommendations suggest that all this can be disposed of 
quite simply. In response to the argument that leaving the matter in 
the juvenile court preserves a distinctive (more deterministic) mission, 
Zimring protests that there is no "logical reason" why this should be 
so. Adult courts can have this focus just as well (p. 174). All that it 
takes is for adult criminal courts to realize their true functions - to 
calibrate the punishment to fit the individual culpability of the of­
fender. 
It is hard to fault Zimring for viewing this bifurcated system of 
criminal responsibility as creating irrationally strong divides between 
what are more slippery concepts. By degree, there are good reasons 
to treat young people differently with respect to their criminal culpa­
bility and "room to reform" (p. 142). Adults are more capable of 
casting off the disadvantages of circumstance and making their own 
decisions responsibly. But these are differences of degree rather than 
kind. The trick of separating the juvenile court system from the adult 
system is to essentialize these gradated differences into paradigms of 
the consummately responsible adult and the inevitably irresponsible 
youth.34 It is this essentialization to which Zimring objects. 
Juvenile justice is not the only example of this essentialization. It 
is also the chosen path for dealing with insanity. Rather than recog­
nizing that every person experiences differing degrees of mental 
health, the insanity defense draws another bright line between the 
completely responsible and the wholly irresponsible. It is a line that 
even Judge Bazelon, who authored a relatively expansive test for legal 
insanity, was willing to concede. His Durham test may have expanded 
the class of criminals who could be exonerated for their mental states, 
but there continued to be something that looked at least from the out­
side like a category of insanity that had conceptual limits. Those who 
fit themselves in the category successfully were completely exoner­
ated, and those that should have been marginal cases were treated as 
wholly culpable.35 
Maybe, as a matter of logic, the structure of the criminal law ought 
not to have taken such a categorical approach. But there is a reason 
for such an approach that must at least be addressed: a free will-based 
34. Zimring notes this phenomenon, with complaint, in the context of absolute age bars 
to any ascription of criminal capacity, by any court. The problem with these rules, he notes, 
is that they treat the matter of capacity as if it were absolute, rather than a matter of degree. 
P.75. 
35. The Durham test freed the jury to determine if behavior was the product of mental 
illness, rather than focusing on the rigid M'Naghten framework. See generally Durham v. 
United States, 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954); Symposium, Insanity and the Criminal Law -
A Critique o/ Durham v. United States, 22 U. Orr. L. REV. 317 (1955). Judge Bazelon was 
concerned to keep a line of defense against the insights of deterministic science and to pre­
serve social understandings of responsibility. See Green II, supra note 4, at 170-171. 
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system, if it is to serve the responsibility-enhancing mission set out for 
it, needs to remain somewhat free of corrupting deterministic influ­
ences.36 Attempts to give a deterministic view too big a place in adult 
systems have typically collapsed, no doubt because of the fear that 
giving an inch to those who wish to deny personal responsibility will so 
quickly give way to a very troubling mile.37 The Progressive Era jurist 
John Wigmore, concerned about the effect of encroaching determinis­
tic criminal justice on human responsibility, suggested that such a view 
be locked away, "confined to the very limited and feasible field of, say, 
juvenile offenses, until it can demonstrate its right to a safe and grad­
ual enlargement."38 Insofar as society wishes to recognize the truth of 
determinism, it can only do it by placing it in a safe space, far away 
from the main criminal justice system. 
Similarly, Zimring's suggestion that the goals of retribution and re­
form in sentencing can be met within a single sentence, in addition to 
being highly implausible,39 fails to appreciate the adult court's need to 
send a clear and consistent message about the reality of criminal re­
sponsibility. The need to preserve a free will focus in adult criminal 
justice is not simply a need to preserve a numerical identity between 
the length of sentences actually ordered and the length of sentences 
deserved. Rather, the fear that deterministic criminal justice will 
erode a sense of personal responsibility is linked to what is perceived 
to be the conceptual underpinning behind the criminal law.40 That de­
sert and reform can numerically coincide does not entail that they can 
coincide ideologically. The message of the criminal law is sent by 
36. See supra text accompanying notes 10-12. 
37. See supra text accompanying notes 9-16. 
38. See John H. Wigmore, Comments on Dr. Gosline's Comments, 15 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 505, 508 (1924-25), discussed in �reen I, supra note 2, at 2028. 
39. In light of the lessening of sentencing discretion, the "range" of sentencing that 
Zimring relies on to provide the framework for reform-based punishment is ever decreasing. 
The trend of criminal justice, following the retributivist tum, is to more closely match pun­
ishment with desert and lessen the ability of judges to deviate for other kinds of reasons. See 
supra text accompanying notes 32-33. Further, it is not at all clear that desert-minded people 
would be indifferent to where, within the range of allowable punishment, different offenders 
would fall. To the extent that there is a range available, the public pays attention to who 
gets what within that range. Not all people who commit murder in the first degree must re­
ceive the death penalty, but it is a matter of public notice when someone who is seen to de­
serve the death penalty does not receive it. See generally Stephen B. Bright & Patrick J. 
Keenan, Judges and the Politics of Death: Deciding Between the Bill of Rights and the Next 
Election in Capital Cases, 75 B.U. L. REV. 759 (1995) (chronicling public pressures on judges 
to impose the death penalty in high-profile cases). Even outside of death penalty issues, the 
notion that the public is indifferent to whether certain criminals receive relatively harsh or 
light sentences is highly implausible. The contours of "deserved" crime are not as flexible as 
Zimring hopes, and the extent that reform can be imposed within them is accordingly 11t­
tenuated. 
40. See Green I, supra note 2, at 2025-27 (discussing the views of John Wigmore on the 
centrality of the principle of deterrence in criminal law). 
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more than simply the number of years the criminal is incarcerated. 
Zimring cannot hope that a compromise about the number of years in 
prison can wash away the true difference between the reform-based 
sentence and the retributive sentence.41 
Thus, the categories of juvenile and adult justice are considerably 
more rigid than Zimring recognizes. The implication of this categori­
cal approach for Zimring is that in formulating his recommendations, 
he must recognize, in a way his approach fails to, the ultimate central­
ity of the battle over the jurisdiction of the juvenile court over certain 
young offenders. What is at stake is in the outer definition of a very 
crucial category. Those who end up in the juvenile justice system will 
inevitably be seen and treated as having less personal responsibility 
than those who end up in the adult system. Zimring's collapsing of the 
two systems neglects this central truth. 
C. Lessons 
The need to keep the adult system pure of the corrupting influ­
ences of determinism can be seen by looking to the sorry fate of at­
tempts to implement such reforms in the Progressive Era and more re­
cently. The reasons for their failure should reinfoi:ce skepticism that 
Zimring's approach can be successful. 
First, consider the central case of the failure of the Progressive-Era 
positivists to take control of the adult court. Zimring's individualized 
approach to criminal justice resonates with their reform efforts. Much 
like Zimring, the Progressive positivists recognized offenders' incom­
plete responsibility for their actions and the corresponding need for 
reform-based punishment. Like Zimring, Progressive reformers 
linked lack of responsibility with the need to provide reform-based 
punishment. The factors that made individual criminals less than 
completely responsible for their crimes also counseled against pun­
ishment with a retributive purpose. Justifying the criminal justice sys­
tem in terms of reform was a much more appropriate response to 
criminal behavior caused by social or individual sicknesses rather than 
purely the free choice of the offender. As with Zimring, individualiza­
tion was the central characterizing feature of the Progressive agenda, 
as it allowed sensitivity to the particular determining social factors that 
had led to the offender's commission of the crime as well as the best 
strategy for reform.42 
· 
41. Of course, this opens the possibility that the criminal justice system could publicly 
operate as a retributive system, while the specialists within it would secretly make decisions 
with reform in mind. Duplicitous though it may seem, this idea has a relatively long lineage. 
Green refers to it as "disjunction." See Green II, supra note 4, at 127-29. 
42 See ROTHMAN, supra note 6, at 50, 59-60; Green II, supra note 4, at 70-71. 
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Zimring may appear to be different from the Progressive reformers 
in that much of his argument presupposes some amount of deserved 
punishment (pp. 143-44). This does differentiate him from the most 
deterministic of the group.43 Most Progressive jurists, though, did con­
cede that some notion of desert would continue to play a role, at least 
in the guilt-assessment phase of trial, even if they may have wished ul­
timately to annihilate all notions of desert from criminal justice.44 
They concentrated primarily on the more limited ambitions of bol­
stering the availability of excuses at the guilt assessment phase to re­
flect an attenuated deterministic vision, and shaping the punishment 
phase to completely eliminate free will-based punitiveness.45 
Zimring's concession- most likely, for practical reasons - of some 
degree of deserved punishment is consistent with the pragmatic ap­
proach of most Progressive reformers. 
Even Zimring's attempts to press single sentences into the double 
duty of satisfying the demands of reform and retribution are not new. 
Many positivist thinkers in the Progressive Era attempted to "sell" 
their deterministic systems by touting the ways in which the features of 
these systems were compatible with what a free will-based system 
would require. Reforming criminals, they claimed, could also meet 
the social need for retribution. These thinkers asserted that somehow, 
in some way (and here they were short on explanation), the threat of 
individualized reform could deter future criminality in the same way 
as punishment and satisfy a public hungry for vengeance.46 
The lesson that Zimring should take from the Progressive-Era re­
formers is that, despite their attempts, their ideals never really took 
hold in the adult system - it was only in the juvenile system that they 
met with any significant degree of success.47 Ideally, for many positiv­
ists, the transition between youth and adult criminal justice would 
have been as seamless as it is for Zimring.48 Instead, they gained only 
a "pocket" of control over the juvenile justice system. 
43. Many progressive reformers denied the possibility of any degree of free will·based 
responsibility for criminal conduct. See Green II, supra note 4, at 32-42 (discussing, among 
others, the psychoanalyst William A. White). 
44. See Green II, supra note 4, at 81-102 (discussing John Waite and Alfred Gausewitz). 
45. See Green I, supra note 2, at 1918, 1922-29; Green II, supra note 4, at 28. 
46. See Green I, supra note 2, at 2030-31 (discussing William A. White's belief that "his 
preferred reform program would meet the requirements of retribution and general deter­
rance" and ultimately satisfy society's feelings of "vengeance"); Green II, supra note 4, at 26 
("The very unpleasantness of "treatment" would have both specific and general deterrence 
effects."). 
47. See Green II, supra note 4, at 27, 70-71, 87-88, 93-95. 
48. Many Progressive-Era positivists recommended that the adult system be modeled on 
the juvenile court. See William A. White, M.D., 13 AB.A. J. 551, 553 (1927). 
May 2000] American Youth Violence 1989 
Even their success with juvenile justice was by no means complete. 
Many juvenile criminals still ended up in "reformatories" whose re­
formative purpose was not always readily apparent.49 On the whole, 
however, the juvenile justice system was different. It did not function 
as a criminal court because its subjects were not seen to possess the 
requisite free will.50 Americans were much more comfortable with de­
terminism where children were concerned; when it came to adults, 
free will still ruled. 
Progressive-Era positivists did manage to attain some limited suc­
cess in the adult system, but even that has not survived. The Progres­
sive's success with adults was somewhat contradictory, involving a split 
between the theories behind the guilt-assessment and the sentencing 
phases of trial.51 The guilt-assessment phase of the trial has always 
presupposed the complete free will of the offender. The "main de­
fenses of unfreedom," duress and legal insanity, were (and continue to 
be) very narrowly defined.52 Criminals were presumed to have in­
tended the natural consequences of their acts, and to have freely 
willed those intentions. Progressive-Era sentencing, by contrast, more 
fully incorporated positivist ideas - sentences were individualized to 
reflect the particular treatment required for rehabilitation. Through 
devices like indeterminate sentencing, parole, and probation, Progres­
sive reformers attempted to transform criminal punishment into 
treatment that could genuinely reform the offender.53 
In the adult context, the bulk of these Progressive-Era sentencing 
reforms have been effectively reversed. Sentences are anything but 
indeterminate and individualized. Some small pockets of reform­
mindedness remain, but all in all, retributive sentencing pervades the 
modern system.54 The tension embodied by treating adults as free in 
the guilt-assessment phase and determined in the sentencing phase 
was not able to withstand the passage of time. Especially in light of 
the particularly strong social trend towards the taking of greater indi­
vidual responsibility, free will won out. 
That the failure of the adult court to adopt the Progressive-Era re­
forms was due to fears of the influence of deterministic thinking can 
be see in the Progressive-Era Chicago Boys' Court, chronicled by 
49. See ROTHMAN, supra note 6, at 43-81. 
50. See Michael Willrich, City of Courts: Crime, Law and Social Governance in 
Chicago, 1880-1930, at 411-63 (Apr.10, 1999) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). 
51. See Green I, supra note 2, at 1925-26. 
52 See id. at 1924. 
53. The advantage of these particular devices was that their flexibility allowed adequate 
response to the criminal's changing condition: "No one compelled a physician to prescribe 
in advance for the patient . . . . " ROTHMAN, supra note 6, at 43-44, 59-60. 
54. See Kadish, supra note 29, at 978-81. 
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Michael Wilhich.55 The Boys' Court took young men who were old 
enough to be held responsible as adult criminals, and attempted to 
treat them with some of the deterministic tools characteristic of the ju­
venile court.56 Although the Boys' Court was itself a separate court, in 
some way discrete from the juvenile and adult systems, the boys inside 
of it had reached an age where they were considered to be adults, and 
the same laws that governed the adult system governed them. Despite 
their technical adult status under the criminal law, they still seemed to 
many reformers less responsible and more pliable than those in the 
adult system. 
The Boys' Court demonstrated the problems inherent in attempt­
ing to combine the philosophies of the juvenile and adult systems. As 
a reform-based system, it was far from ideal because it had to operate 
within the framework of the adult criminal law, with the required 
adult procedures and adult-length sentences.57 It tried to account for 
the age of the young men by incorporating juvenile court techniques. 
The court employed psychiatric and sociological specialists,58 and fre­
quently used continuances as a means of replicating some of the bene­
fits of the indeterminate sentence.59 Even with the genuine desire by 
those involved in the movement to treat these boys as reformable ju­
veniles,60 the inflexibly free will-based adult law stood in the way. 
Rather than being able to calibrate appropriately the adult law to take 
account of the diminished responsibility of youth, Boys' Court judges 
were forced to resort to ordering that offenders be re-booked on lesser 
charges that carried lesser penalties.61 The obstacle of a jury system, 
which would no doubt be less sensitive to the enlightened positivist 
agenda, had to be avoided through dubiously voluntary waivers on the 
part of defendants.62 The adult law, then as now, was not suitable for 
the view that its subjects were less than fully responsible for their acts. 
What ultimately doomed the Boys' Court was the threat that even 
this small amount of deterministic thinking about seemingly adult-like 
criminals seemed to pose. Even though the Boys' Court incorporated 
enough adult-type features to profoundly disappoint positivistic re­
formers,63 the conservatives still accused it of leniency in dealing with 
55. See Willrich, supra note 50, at 403. 
56. See id. at 420. 
57. See id. at 428. 
58. See id. at 447-48. 
59. See id. at 442-43. 
60. See id. at 428-29. 
61. See id. at 440-41. 
62 See id. at 440. 
63. See id. at 461-62. 
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serious offenders who, after all, were of age.64 The "contradictions in­
herent in the idea of the 'juvenile adult' " were too much for society to 
swallow; adults were adults, and they had to be treated with the ap­
propriate presumption of free will.65 
The effects of deterministic threats to the free will-based system of 
adult punishment are also apparent in modern systems of blended ju­
risdiction, where young offenders acknowledged to have an adult-like 
culpability remain in juvenile court. These systems leave juvenile 
cases involving offenders who would otherwise be waived to the adult 
court in the juvenile courts, while giving those courts the power to im­
pose adult-length sentences on young offenders (pp. 14-15). Zimring 
himself notes that the responses to blended jurisdiction have been less 
than supportive. Courts asked to enforce adult sentences within a ju­
venile framework suffer a "cognitive dissonance" between the com­
peting visions of their defendants, the free adult and the determined 
child (p. 172). "Twenty year sentences may be socially unavoidable" 
as a response, presumably, to a vision of adult-type responsibility for 
crime, "but [they] could still be inappropriate for a court that must put 
great weight on the interests of juveniles." (p. 169). With blended ju­
risdiction, the court must also provide adult procedural protections, 
the sort that caused so much trouble for the positivist agenda of the 
Boys' Court (p. 170). Because of these rigid structures, it is difficult 
for blended jurisdiction to respond to the vision of offenders as juve­
niles. The law has decided to treat these offenders as adults, and adult 
treatment does not blend well with the philosophy of the juvenile 
court. 
As with the Boys' Court, even though the blended juvenile court 
has largely failed to treat these young offenders under a more deter­
ministic philosophy, it is not enough to counter the perceived threat 
these systems pose to the adult free �ill presumption. Blended juris­
diction is perceived as inadequate to address the social demand for 
punishment of those responsible enough to deserve it. The common 
sentencing strategy of blended jurisdiction is to provide for adult­
length sentences in a youth-driven conditional framework. If the of­
fender is not helped by her time in the juvenile system, she will serve 
the whole adult sentence; if she is reformed, she will go free at the end 
of her minority (pp. 170-71 ). Zimring recognizes that the degree of 
determinism inherent in this sort of sentence is precisely why legisla­
tures have been reluctant to cede much authority to these kinds of sys­
tems. They are not sufficiently punitive or free will-based. Even when 
there is a system of blended jurisdiction, the worst youth offenders 
64. See id. at 460. 
65. Id. at 463. 
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end up in adult court anyway (pp. 170-71).66 Society is not comfort­
able with the law allowing these adult-type juvenile offenders even a 
small degree of juvenile treatment. 
These examples show that reform efforts that rely on introducing a 
deterministic threat to the adult criminal justice system have consis­
tently failed. Thus, Zimring's efforts to reform juvenile justice by de­
nying the philosophical divide between the juvenile and adult courts 
seem unlikely to succeed, barring some explanation (absent in this 
book) of why they should survive the difficulties with bringing the two 
approaches together. 
D. Reevaluating the Data 
Regardless of the merits of his reform proposals, Zimring's data 
about the nature of youth criminality and the court's treatment of it 
provide a valuable opportunity to consider precisely how the present 
dual juvenile/adult system deals with the conflicts between free will 
and determinism. In particular, the criteria for allocating offenders 
into each domain are a fruitful source for probing the issue. The pres­
ent allocation of young offenders into adult and juvenile courts makes 
at least some sense when viewed in the light of the social need to af­
firm responsibility while recognizing some degree of determination. 
Zimring describes our current situation: our bright line between 
juvenile and adult court is presently defined not absolutely by age, but 
instead by age plus some consideration of the type of criminality. Cer­
tain youth are categorized as adults for the purposes of responsibility 
on the basis of the seriousness or frequency of their crimes (p. 74). 
Those who end up in adult court are those who have committed very 
serious crimes, such as homicide, those with extensive criminal rec­
ords, or those on the brink of chronological adulthood (p. 109). 
These kids end up in adult court not simply because they happen 
to deserve a sentence marginally larger than what the juvenile court 
could dole out (Zimring's suggested test).67 They are there because 
they are no longer seen as children. As Zimring correctly notes, the 
mere fact of committing serious or frequent crimes, endows the of­
fender with automatic maturity in the eyes of many in the culture (pp. 
66. Even if they remain in juvenile court, they may do so at the cost of transforming the 
juvenile court into a exact copy of the free will·based adult system. Zimring notes this effect: 
while presently they may be designed for only serious offenses, once blended jurisdiction 
systems are installed, "the barrier between aggravated and standard delinquency can be 
lowered by increments on a never-ending basis." P. 172. After all, Zimring rightly notes, 
"[i]f armed robbers should be subject to the extended penalties and enhanced procedures, 
why not all robbers?" P. 172. A free will approach to criminality, once set free in the juve­
nile court, threatens to take over entirely. 
67. See supra pp. 1989-90. 
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8-10, 73, 144). Zimring also understands the complex function these 
transfers serve in the division of criminal justice into separate spheres: 
The symbolic value of transfer to criminal courts is that it seems to com­
pletely resolve the conflict that many citizens feel when very young ado­
lescents are charged with serious acts of violence. The conflict is be­
tween the impulse to punish criminals, on the one hand, and to protect 
children and youths, on the other. Transfer to adult court resolves this 
conflict by declaring the defendant to be no longer a child. [p. 14] 
As a rational matter, Zimring is right to criticize this: if placement 
in juvenile court is supposed to reflect something about one's degree 
of responsibility, this allocation doesn't map on quite right. Immatur­
ity can drive one to murder,68 just as it can drive one to commit other 
less serious crimes. As Zimring notes, "[t]here are . . .  no indications 
that violent juveniles are either more or less mature than other youths 
of the same age who are arrested" (p. 164). Drawing distinctions 
about responsibility based almost entirely on the severity of the crime 
committed is, for that reason, irrational. 
When viewed in light of the rigidly dualistic system that presently 
exists, however, this allocation of offenders makes some sense. Mak­
ing what appears to be a de facto categorical exception for homicides 
and a few equivalently serious crimes to be inherently adult retains the 
bright-line nature of the division between the courts.69 If courts were 
to decide, as Zimring recommends, based on each individual's degree 
of responsibility and moral desert, the tidy dual system is challenged. 
Every offender is both determined, to a degree, and free, to a degree. 
The sensitive inquiry as to how much of each this offender is leaves us 
with data that makes us uncomfortable in either court. If he falls just 
below the responsibility line, he seems too much like an adult to fit 
into the juvenile court fiction. If he falls just above, the court knows 
the ways in which he is less than free, and finds it harder to justify the 
retribution that will be taken against him. But if his special circum­
stances are to be taken into account, why not the circumstances of the 
eighteen-year-old, or the twenty-year-old, or the forty-five-year-old 
with mild mental retardation? Fuzzy lines pose challenges we may not 
be prepared to meet. The de facto homicide line, or the repeat of­
fender line, provides a workable strategy for avoiding this problem. 
68. Zimring gives the example of serious crimes committed by juveniles because of peer 
pressure. P. 151 (recounting the story of a juvenile who was taunted by his victim as being 
"too chicken" to pull the trigger). 
69. Zimring's data show that when prosecutors request waiver in homicide cases, it is 
almost always granted. P. 114. In the sample he used, prosecutors only made such a request 
in 31 % of cases. This shows that some individualized, rather than categorical, discretion re­
mains for prosecutors to decide whether to file for waiver. Once in court, however, it seems 
apparent that there is a strong presumption that homicide waiver requests should be 
granted. 
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Seriousness and frequency of crime also map onto an important 
social phenomenon, that of identification. Zimring's data show us that 
a fair number of young people commit crimes (even violent ones) in 
their youth, and never offend again (p. 84). A fair number of citizens 
and legislators can remember (perhaps even fondly) the fights and mi­
nor shoplifting of their youth and know for a fact that their failure to 
be held fully responsible did not lead to a life of hardened criminality. 
Juveniles who stay in juvenile court seem to be more like everyday 
people. This reassures us that the threat of treating these youth as de­
termined can be contained. By contrast, few of us remember our 
youthful homicides, or our years in criminal gangs. 
Zimring notes that, in many ways, violent crime is "kid stuff" and 
should be treated as a normal phase of human development, rather 
than as a pathology (p. 84). Maybe this should be true of homicides as 
well as of other types of violent assaults (especially if Zimring is right 
that the rise in youth homicide is merely a rise in the availability of 
guns, rather than a rise in the brutality of the relevant youth (pp. 36-
38) ), but it is certainly hard to convince most people of this. Even if a 
youth murderer is no more responsible than the schoolyard brawler 
we tolerate, perhaps there are reasons to fear that the effect on the of­
fender of having taken a human life makes it impossible to return to a 
normal life. Our ability to identify the young offender with things that 
normal citizens might have done in their youth is a strong determinant 
of the category of youth crime. 
This phenomenon compares interestingly to the insanity defense, 
where identification cuts in the reverse direction. One of the determi­
nants of the acceptable boundaries of the insanity category is that the 
offender be a person with whom we are not able to identify. If she is 
very far out of the bounds of normal human existence, there is less 
reason to worry that denying her responsibility will lead to a wholesale 
erosion of the idea of free will in everyone else.70 This reversal of 
identification in the youth category and the insanity category makes 
perfect sense: youth is a common condition that most people have 
survived with free will intact. Insanity, by contrast, is pathology. The 
category of youth is chosen as reassurance that this condition of irre­
sponsibility will go away. Identification here is an advantage. The 
category of insanity does quite the opposite. It represents a terrifying 
incursion on responsibility that may not be controllable.71 The insanity 
70. See Green II, supra note 4, at 186 (quoting Herbert Wechsler, The Criteria of Crimi­
nal Responsibility, 22 U. CHI. L. REV. 367, 374-75 (1955)). 
71. See id. at 18 ("The entire paradigm of responsibility could not withstand the criticism 
of scientific positivists once the field of legal insanity was no longer restricted to special and 
assertedly rare conditions that were co=only understood to demonstrate a person's total 
lack of ability to control his behavior."). 
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category must distance these offenders so that their sickness will have 
nothing whatsoever to do with normal life. 
The way in which offenders are presently allocated into the juve­
nile and adult courts supports the idea that the dual court system plays 
a role in navigating the tensions between free will and determinism. 
The precise contours of waiver decisions reflect a system that is at­
tempting to give credit about individual causes of criminality within a 
general framework that affirms free will. 
ill. CONCLUSION 
Zimring's attempts to rationalize our approach to youth criminal 
justice neglect the special role of the criminal justice system in affirm­
ing free will in the face of the nagging suspicion that much of human 
behavior is determined. Because of this important role, courts as­
signing personal responsibility can never be as neatly rational and con­
sistent as Zimring recommends. 
